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ANew Look at an Old Association: 
Will Today's Women Be Tomorrow's Jaycees? 
by Neal Devins 
ISSUES 
Roberts, et al. 
v. 
United States Jaycees 
(Docket No. 83-724) 
ArguedApril18, 1984 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court 
will tackle the knotty problems of whether freedom of 
association is an independent constitutional protection 
and, if so, whether the Jaycees can invoke freedom of 
association as a justifiable basis for their nationwide 
policy of excluding women from their rolls as full mem-
bers. 
The Jaycees case is attracting a lot of national atten-
tion for a number of reasons. First, it is unclear whether 
there is a straightforward protection for the freedom of 
the association. If one exists, its contours are unknown. 
Second, the Jaycees is one of the nation's largest mem-
bership organizatons - with 271,000 individual male 
members in 6,909 chapters. Third, the Supreme Court 
decision might define the constitutional rights of mem-
bership organizations and this is of great significance to 
many of these organizations. (Not surprisingly, grol!Ps 
like the Rotary, Kiwanis and the Boy Scouts have all filed" 
amicus briefs in support of the Jaycees.) Fourth, this 
lawsuit once again calls into question the nature of the 
states' interest in preventing sex discrimination. (Conse-
quently, groups like the National Organization for Wo-
men and the American Civil Liberties Union have also 
filed amicus briefs on the state's side of the case.) 
Finally, and most importantly, the Jaycees case will 
test the constitutionality (as it applies to the Jaycees) of a 
Minnesota statute which prohibits sex discrimination in 
"public accommodations." 
This case is also of great interest because it pits two 
discordant elements of our constitutional system against 
each other. Sex discrimination laws seek to guarantee a 
minimum standard of treatment to a large segment of 
our population. In many ways, such laws reflect the 
socialist vision of life treatment. Freedom of association, 
on the other hand, is an individualistic liberation con-
struct. It allows people to choose with ~hom they want 
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(and with whom they don't want) to keep company. The 
preeminence of either right is the necessary disparage-
ment of the other. Consequently, at its roots, the Jaycees 
case raises the fundamental social policy question of 
whether state-created group entitlements should prevail 
over the individual and his or her personal preferences. 
FACTS 
The Jaycees case is an appeal by the state of Minne-
sota from a 1983 decision by a divided panel of the 
United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 
March, 1982, the United States District Court for Min-
nesota had ruled in favor of the state. Prior to that 
ruling, in October, 1979, a state administrative law judge 
found the Jaycees had violated Minnesota's Human 
Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination in public ac-
commodations. This state decision was the basis of sub-
sequent federal litigation. 
The Jaycees, although organized in 1835 to enhance 
the development of young men, permitted women to 
become associate members. "Associate status" is akin to 
being a poor cousin state. An associate cannot vote, hold 
office, or be eligible for awards. Consequently, it is ar-
gued that women are denied the professional opportu-
nities accorded to male members. 
The origins of the Jaycees lawsuit was a dispute be-
tween the national organization and the Minneapolis 
and St. Paul chapters of the organization. In 197 4 and 
1975, women were allowed to become full members of 
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters. Such mem-
bership afforded women the right to vote, hold office 
and be eligible for awards. 
The national Jaycee organization subsequently in-
formed the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapter that their 
practice violated the organization's bylaws. After being 
notified by the national organization that their chapters 
were in danger, Minneapolis and St. Paul members al-
leged before the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights that the proposed charter allocations violated a 
state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommo-
dations. 
A state administrative law judge held that the Jaycees 
was a public accommodation under the state law. Conse-
quently, because its sexually discriminatory membership 
practices violated the statute, the Jaycees were enjoined 
from revoking the charter of any Minnesota chapter 
which admitted women members. 
In appealing this decision in federal district court, 
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the Jaycees offered three arguments: 1) Applying Min-
nesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees inter-
feres with their constitutional rights of asseciation; 2) 
The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling gov-
ernmental interest sufficient to outweigh the Jaycees' 
right of association, and 3) The Minnesota statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. The state disagreed with each 
of these assertions. At the district court level, the state 
prevailed on all three issues. (The state, in a decision 
related to this lawsuit, also prevailed in the effort to have 
the Minnesota Supreme Court rule that the United 
States Jaycees is a place of public accommodation under 
Minnesota law. Since state supreme court decisions are 
final on matters of state law, the Jaycees could not ap-
peal this ruling.) 
At the outset of this opinion, the district court noted: 
"It is questionable whether association not directed at 
the exercise of other First Amendment rights enjoys 
constitutional protection." The court did not resolve 
that issue, however. Instead, it based its conclusion on 
the related notions that: "Invidious private discrimina-
tion is not entitled to affirmative constitutional protec-
tion, and that the state's interest in preventing 
discrimination in access to public accommodations is in 
any event sufficiently compelling to override whatever 
right of association exists." The district court also re-
jected the Jaycees' vagueness argument. 
The appellate court, in a 2 to 1 decision, reversed. 
Crucial to that ruling was its holding: "That the Jaycees, 
a substantial part of whose activities involve the expres-
sion of social and political beliefs and the advocacy of 
legislation and conditional change, does have a right of 
association protected by the First Amendment." In 
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court emphasized 
the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Alabama (357 
U.S. 449 (1958)), which held: "It is immaterial whether 
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain 
to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and 
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the 
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." 
This ruling is significant given that the stated pur-
pose of the J aycees-the professional advancement and 
development of young men-is not a traditionally pro-
tected First Amendment activity. Additionally, some of 
the Jaycees' positions on ··women's issues" might have 
been affected by a change in membership practices. For 
example, the Jaycees have spoken out against the Equal 
Rights Amendment and a woman's right to abortion-on-
demand. The state of Minnesota had contended that 
First Amendment association protections should not be 
triggered: "The Jaycees can point to no organization 
goal to which women cannot and do not aspire, no 
organization function which women cannot perform, 
and no organization position regarding which sex man-
dates a point of view." 
The appellate court also ruled that the state's interest 
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in prohibiting sex discrimination in public accommoda-
tions is not sufficiently compelling to justify an abridge-
ment of the associational freedom. The appellate court 
did recognize, however, that the state's interest in clear-
ing "the channels of commerce of the irrelevancy of sex 
to make sure that goods and services and advancement 
in the business world are available to all on an equal 
basis" is a public purpose of the "first magnitude." Yet, 
the appellate court felt that the state could accomplish 
the objectives through "ways less directly and immedi-
ately intensive on the freedom of association than an 
outright prohibition [such as denial of tax credits or tax 
exemptions]." The state-stressing the state court's 
binding ruling that the Jaycees were a public accommo-
dation involved in the sale of memberships-had con-
tended that it could not accomplish its end in a less 
intensive manner. The appellate court also validated the 
Jaycees argument that denial of full membership status 
to women did not materially limit women in their efforts 
to succeed in business and professional life. The state 
criticized this conclusion, arguing that: "The supposi-
tion that there are other avenues of professional ad-
vancement is based upon the moribund theory of 
'separate but equal."' 
The appellate court also concluded that the Minne-
sota statute was unconstitutionally vague. The appellate 
court viewed as mystifying the state court ruling that the 
Kiwanis organization was private and the Jaycee's pub-
lic. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that 
persons of ordinary intelligence could not distinguish 
between protected private and unprotected public or-
ganizations. The state claimed that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court ruling was based in a principled-and 
discernable-application of the statute. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The Jaycees case speaks directly to the pressing ques-
tion of whether or how the state can protect a woman's 
right to participate in America's "free market economy." 
Clearly, the state can prevent overt forms of discrimina-
tion. Yet, state action which interfered with an associa-
tion's internal practices raises fundamental questions 
about the degree of permissible state interference in 
private decisionmaking. Although the Jaycees permit all 
males between the ages of 18 to 35 to become members, 
it is possible that that group of individuals have an 
agenda distinct both from women and from men in 
other age groups. Also, if the state prevails on this issue, 
it is an open question as to how the state can involve 
itself in the membership practices of other more discrete 
organizations. 
On the other hand, sex discrimination is a proper 
concern of the state. The state thus should be permitted 
to remove artificial business which limits a woman's right 
to freely participate in public or quasi-public activities. 
This right is especially significant when it is associated 
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with professional self-advancement (as it is in this case). 
The key task for the Court (and it is a hefty one) is to 
distinguish between private association and public dis-
crimination. Such line drawing is not easy both because 
each side can make a convincing case and because the 
constitutional stakes are fairly high. On one hand, a 
decision in favor of the Jaycees will make it quite easy to 
assert the associational privilege. The plus side of such a 
result is increased cultural pluralism and greater self-
determination. Yet, a decision in favor of the Jaycees 
also has the concomitant risk of allowing quasi-public 
organizations to indiscriminately shut their doors on 
certain classes of individuals. This occurrence might 
lead to greater social stratification. 
A decision in favor of the state, on the other hand, 
would provide women (and possibly other groups) with 
a greater right to shape their own future and to shape 
society. Although this is a good result, such a state-guar-
anteed right may prove too costly. State-prescribed limi-
tations on the associational freedom of individuals is at 
odds with our liberalistic tradition. 
It is difficult to assess whether the Supreme Court 
can formulate a constitutional doctrine sensitive to the 
needs of both individual perogative and group advance-
ment. If it can, we will all gain through the Jaycees deci-
sion. If it cannot, either the goal of social justice or self-
determinism will gain at the expense of the other. 
ARGUMENTS 
For the United States Jaycees 
1. The application of Minnesota's Public Accommoda-
Issue No. 32 
tion law to the Jaycees interferes with the Jaycees 
constitutional right of association. 
2. The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest sufficient to outweigh the Jay-
cees right of association. 
3. The Minnesota statute is unconstitutional on grounds 
of vagueness and overbreadth. 
For the State of Minnesota 
1. Application of the Minnesota statute does not burden 
the Jaycees' First Amendment rights. 
2. The state interest in prohibiting sex discrimination is 
compelling and there are no less restrictive means 
available to the state to advance that compelling inter-
est. 
3. The Minnesota statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of Minnesota 
The states of New York and California, North-
western Bell, Alliance for Women Membership, Na-
tional Organization for Women, American Jewish 
Committee, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, American 
Civil Liberties Union, National League of Cities, United 
States Conference of Mayors, and others. 
In Support of the Jaycees 
Conference of Private Organizations, Boy Scouts of 
America, Rotary International. 
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